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The Paradox of Militaristic Remembrance in British Sport and Popular Culture 
John Kelly 
University of Edinburgh 
Introduction 
The position and utility of sport in cementing military and civil relations are well 
established.1 It is beyond doubt that since the post-September 11 2001 
invasions/liberations of Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent American-led “war 
on terror” (WoT), Britain (along with others) has mirrored the United States in 
placing nation-state and state-sponsored militarism at the center of cultural and civic 
society in ways that encourage and facilitate public engagement and universal support 
for nation-state, state militarism and the WoT. From 2003 onwards both the United 
States and Canada set up government departments devoted to providing propaganda 
opportunities for their military. The United States’ Operation Tribute to Freedom 
noted on its website that it seeks “media opportunities” for soldiers “to share their 
experience with their local communities in an effort to ensure the public maintains a 
direct connection to today’s army.”2 Operation Connection, the Canadian equivalent, 
exercises similar aims and coordinates identical activities seeking to manufacture 
public consent for the Canadian military.3 
 
Whilst the British government has no outwardly facing department overtly engaged in 
such propaganda initiatives, many of the same activities and discourses orchestrated 
by the American and Canadian departments have been replicated in Britain in what 
has become a multi-agency approach to encourage and facilitate British citizens to 
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“appreciate and understand” the military.4 The British government has been open and 
explicit about two particular initiatives. In 2012, it was announced that £2 million 
would be used to fund the Military in Schools project partly aimed at 
transforming military personnel into school ‘teachers’ to ensure children “can 
benefit from the values of a military ethos.”5 This was supplemented by the 
government using the Libor banking fines, imposed on banks for unscrupulous and 
illegal banking practices, to boost military charities. There is irony in the British 
government funding military charities primarily because the government does not 
provide sufficient care to vulnerable (ex)soldiers6 in the first place. Of course, by 
making such a public donation (from funds taken from disdained bankers), unlike 
direct and inconspicuous government funding, this permits the accumulation of 
ideological capital and (real or perceived) public support for the military to occur in 
ways that normal government funding may struggle to achieve.  
 
Paralleling the United States and Canada, a central feature of Britain’s multi-agency 
strategy involves encouraging citizens to view nation-state, state militarism, and the 
WoT as inextricably interwoven into the fabric of their virtuous nation. Gee observed 
state militarism being represented as necessary, noting: 
the redemptive value attached to [British and U.S. military] violence 
reinforces facile assumptions that our security depends on military force, 
rather than on structural justice and an ecology of mutual relationships.7  
 
Yet, despite these two latter causes being justly valued, it is about more than 
presenting British militarism as indispensable surrogates for structural injustice and 
unequal international relationships. Implicitly embedded in these overarching 
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militaristic discourses is not merely that ‘our’ security requires military force but the 
idea that military force together with ‘our’ quest for democracy and justice are 
essential constituents of the nation-state, ergo making Britain Britain. These are 
represented as requisite elements which define the country and enable the citizens 
within the imagined community of the nation to re-imagine themselves as direct 
descendants of those who defeated Hitler then Communism and currently face a 
heroic crusade against ‘Islamic’ terror.      
 
British sport has featured heavily as a site for such imaginings. The nature of the sport 
and military nexus can be broadly categorized into four overlapping areas 
1. Sports people paying respect to the military 
2. Injured military personnel becoming athletes 
3. Sports uniforms becoming militarized 
4. Sponsors using sport to support the military.8 
 
British sports fixtures have increasingly observed minute silences and conducted 
additional ceremonial activities around the annual November Remembrance Day 
activities in the lead up to Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday around 11 
November each year. British sports events have also been incorporated into paying 
respect to the military with high-profile annual events featuring injured soldiers being 
welcomed onto the field of play to receive fans’ support and applause and 
occasionally the State’s official thanks and recognition9. Additionally, soldiers have 
increasingly been provided support to become prominent athletes. In Britain, The 
Invictus Games has joined the American Warrior Games to offer a sporting platform 
for injured military personnel to compete and elicit public support. This public 
support is bolstered by sports clubs  (like Bolton Wanderers FC, Raith Rovers FC and 
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Millwall FC) adapting their sporting uniforms to resemble military uniforms and/or 
include military camouflage designs. These sport-related initiatives have been joined 
by a plethora of emergent military charities, some of which have partnered up with 
sporting organizations to seek ideological and financial support from the British 
public. For example, in 2010, the new charity Help for Heroes sponsored the 
[English] Football League, allowing the charity high levels of visibility, while another 
new charity Tickets for Troops enables similar visibility and free tickets for serving 
soldiers for a whole range of high-profile sports occasions.  
 
These events have contributed to a subtle, yet powerful, shift in focus from 
Remembrance representing sorrowful regret for war victims to glorifying 
British/Western militarism in the name of an assumed heroic and justified WoT. 
Whilst it is undeniable that British Remembrance has always had a clear militaristic 
focus (with military uniforms, military insignia and the performance of militarism 
accompanied by salutes and marching battalions), historically there has been a veneer 
of sorrow and regret transcending the narrow confines of pure militarism. This post-
WoT re-articulation of Remembrance unequivocally connects it to current wars and 
narratives of ‘heroes’ “serving the country”. For example, the national football 
(soccer) team shirts of both Scotland and England have recently had specially adapted 
souvenir shirts to include the Earl Haig poppy sewn into the breast and juxtaposed 
alongside the phrase “serving their country: The British forces & Scotland [England] 
national team.” This re-contextualizes the Earl Haig poppy from its historic grounding 
in WWI and WWII remembrance and anchors it in the present to those currently 
engaging in military violence today – illustrated by the verb (serving) being applied in 
the present tense; there is more that could be written on the choice of verb and its 
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patriotic and non-violent connotations, which sanitizes much of the work being 
‘serviced’ but this is beyond the limits of this chapter. Moreover, this military-focused 
Remembrance has grown to become a year round series of omnipresent “support the 
troops” events into which British citizens are incorporated by proxy and subsequently 
expected to dogmatically endorse. 10 British sport and popular culture events have 
been shown to be key arenas in helping facilitate and reinforce this ideologically 
loaded remembrance. 
 
It is within these wider contexts that this chapter considers a number of 
inconsistencies relating to the sport and civil society nexus in Britain, specifically in 
relation to the paradox of militaristic Remembrance in British sport and popular 
culture. The discussion begins by introducing what I call the corporate culpability 
paradox, the overarching inconsistency from which a further three interconnected 
inconsistencies flow. The corporate culpability paradox involves four key elements of 
militarism: ideological cause; actor; action; outcome of action. Their meanings and 
their relationship to one another are central to understanding this paradox and its 
related inconsistencies. For example, their relationship to one another is shown to be 
articulated differently by mainstream British cultural-political opinion formers 
(government, politicians, corporate media, official civic organizations and so forth) 
depending on the ideological cause and actors involved in doing the ‘remembering’– 
according to whether the ideological cause and actor are deemed worthy of the 
nation’s support. This overarching paradox is outlined before illustrating the three 
related inconsistencies, the third and final one of which focuses on a sporting case 
study that exposes the political and ideological basis permeating the overarching 
paradox.  
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Corporate culpability paradox 
The inconsistencies surrounding British ‘remembrance’ relate specifically to how 
actors carrying out violence in the name of an ideological cause are viewed in the UK. 
These are underpinned by the relationships articulated between the four 
aforementioned variables: ideological cause; actor; action; outcome of action. When 
the ideological causes and/or11 actors connected with military violence are supported 
by key opinion formers, some of these four variables can be thought of as legitimately 
separate and unrelated – illustrated by common soundbites such as: “Support the 
troops not the war.” Thus British military actors can be supported and simultaneously 
and seamlessly separated from some or all of the three related variables (ideological 
cause; action; outcome). Conversely when the ideological cause and/or actor are not 
deemed legitimate by government and/or opinion formers – when associated with or 
carried out by those branded terrorists for instance - these four variables are 
inextricably connected and we are told that the actors cannot be separated from the 
ideological cause, their actions and the outcomes of their actions.  
 
Therefore, minority (and/or demonized) groups are often held partly responsible for 
the terrorist cause, terrorists, terrorist violence and the death and destruction resulting 
from terrorist acts, and if someone betrays a hint of ‘support’ for terrorist actors, this 
is articulated as supporting terrorism and murder. This is often illustrated by 
politicians and media demanding action and the reprimanding of violence by “Muslim 
leaders” when ‘terrorist’ atrocities occur (discussed in a later section). Thus, unlike 
‘terrorism,’ British violence can be separated from soldiers and politics as 
demonstrated by common soundbites such as, “I didn’t agree with going into Iraq but 
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they’re our troops and we must support them.” Such is the power of this narrative that 
individuals and organizations risk major criticism if they do not “support the troops.” 
The few times when there is dissent or merely non-conformity towards British 
military endeavors, the non-conformers/dissenters risk being symbolically annihilated 
revealing the extent to which conformity and dogmatic support for British military 
and their ‘work’ is expected.12  
 
Thus, the overarching paradox consists of British military violence being (or 
encouraged to be) universally and dogmatically supported whilst claiming a sense of 
ontological detachment. This is facilitated by the separation of the ideological cause, 
the actors, the actions and the outcomes of such action. Yet violence conducted by 
others is to be demonized whilst claiming ontological attachment as illustrated by an 
unbreakable and seamless connection between the ideological cause, the actors, the 
actions and their outcomes. This paradox leads, moreover, to a further three 
subsequent and related inconsistencies and it is to these the chapter now turns.    
 
Citizens’ culpability for terrorists but not for armies 
Despite British violence being conducted on the alleged behalf of a nation, performed 
by soldiers sent by a democratically elected government and funded by British 
citizens’ taxes, British citizens are encouraged by respected opinion formers to detach 
themselves from the violence and its consequences; hence the popularity of slogans 
such as “support the troops not the war.” Yet terrorists – who by definition act 
without a mandate – are encouraged to be seen as partly representative of minority 
groups. Furthermore, these minority groups are often held partly culpable for 
terrorism and routinely told they “must do more to prevent ‘radicalization’ in their 
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own communities.” For example, Imams within mosques and Muslim leaders more 
generally are expected to check for and actively work to prevent ‘extremism’ and 
‘radicalization’. Wider Muslim populations are regularly held to be partly responsible 
for terrorism. Britain’s foreign secretary Philip Hammond expressed this clearly in the 
aftermath of the Paris attacks of 2014, holding a number of groups and organizations 
responsible for violence, stating, “[A] huge burden of responsibility also lies with 
those who act as apologists for them [terrorists].” As the BBC stated, Hammond 
specified that among those apologists bearing a huge burden of responsibility were 
“parents, schools and community workers [who] all had responsibilities.”13 British 
Culture Secretary, Sajid Javid and British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed 
similar sentiment, with the former stressing: 
All communities can do more to try and help deal with terrorists, try and help 
track them down, but I think it is absolutely fair to say that there is a special 
burden on Muslim communities, because whether we like it or not, these 
terrorists call themselves Muslims.14 
 
British citizens’ democratically elected government equips British military actors with 
hi tech weaponry British citizens have paid for, sending them to fight and kill on the 
(alleged) nation’s behalf. Therefore, unlike the Muslim minorities and ‘Islamic’ 
‘radical/terrorists,’ for which no identifiable financial support nor democratic mandate 
exist, British citizens are undeniably implicated in supporting the actor, action and 
outcome of action. Unlike the British military, terrorists have no democratic mandate 
and have not been funded by the broad Muslim community. Yet, the overarching 
corporate culpability paradox treats both groups differently and, it would appear, 
illogically.  
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Incorporating by proxy 
These calls to publicly reject and demonize the terrorists and those branded their 
supporters relates to the implicitly acknowledged power of propaganda. This fear of 
“radical” websites and effective propaganda carried out by amateurs and “extreme 
radicals” reveals that governments do in fact believe propaganda works. It seems 
reasonable to assume that officially sanctioned, generously funded, culturally valued 
and widespread sport (and other popular cultural) activities, in conjunction with their 
culturally revered sacred sites (Six Nations rugby, World Cups, cricket Test Matches, 
Premiership football stadiums), provide much more powerful and effective 
propaganda for western militarism than “radical” websites or “extremist” preachers 
do for “Islamic” terrorism. Indeed, if this was not the case, the aforementioned 
Operation Tribute to Freedom and Operation Connection government departments in 
the United States and Canada would have little justification for existing or for using 
much needed tax monies to operate.15 These inconsistencies are compounded when 
considering the active and powerful hero-fication of the British militarism process 
that has been ongoing since at least 2007, with British citizens being incorporated by 
proxy into supporting British troops and conflating remembrance with current 
‘wars’.16 Sport and popular culture events have been widely used as stages for British 
citizens to “show their support”. In addition to the aforementioned sporting examples, 
beauty contests, prime time Saturday night television shows, military-related music 
albums, military branded food products, newly formed charities, recently invented 
traditions such as Armed Forces Day and homecoming parades have all combined to 
ensure a multi-agency hero-fication and celebritization of the British military.  
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Incorporating British citizens by proxy into supporting the British military, Lord 
Mawhinney, chairman of the [English] Football League, leaves little room for doubt 
when describing the aforementioned Football League and Help for Heroes 
partnership:  
The contribution being made by our armed forces around the world is truly 
humbling. The football for heroes week will provide an excellent opportunity 
for supporters to show their appreciation for the outstanding work being 
done.17               
 
Similarly, whilst also representing British military action ideologically as virtuous, 
Prime Minister David Cameron incorporated British citizens into giving their support 
to soldiers, in promoting Armed Forces Day: 
These initiatives have the full support of the nation … [Armed Forces Day is] 
an opportunity for the nation to pay respect to those fighting for our freedom 
and way of life.18 
 
These combined comments unequivocally frame British troops as defending “our” 
freedom and engaging in humbling and outstanding work. Despite the ontological 
detachment discussed earlier – “Support the troops not the war” – much of the 
official pronouncements actually make the connections between supporting the troops 
and the war unequivocal. Revealingly, they connect current military violence to wider 
remembrance, the historic war against fascism and also to an ideological and highly 
subjective political statement that such current “work” is defending freedom. But, a 
key point here is that in addition to these ideological connections being made explicit, 
British citizens are told that they are supportive and appreciative; they are 
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incorporated by proxy into fully supporting and endorsing the WoT (ideological 
cause), British soldiers (actor), British military acts of violence (action) and the 
resultant deaths, injuries, and movements of peoples from their homes (outcome of 
action) whether they actually do support these or not.19   
 
Remembrance: neutral sorrow or active support?  
Perhaps one of the most revealing and controversial examples where these paradoxes 
fuse is in Scotland and involves an alternative and equivalent expression of 
remembrance being enacted in public by football (soccer) supporters. The example 
exposes how the relationship between ideological cause, actor, action and outcome of 
action is judged differently depending on whether or not the remembrance is 
supported by key powerful opinion formers in Britain. In 2012, the Scottish 
government introduced a new Offensive Behaviour at Football Bill apparently 
designed to tackle ethno-religious bigotry (or “sectarianism”20 as it is commonly 
referred to in Scotland). “Sectarianism” in Scotland is often perceived to be a football 
related problem mainly involving the supporters of the two biggest football clubs, 
Celtic Football Club and Rangers Football Club21, each with a dual Scottish-
Irish/Ulster identity. Celtic has traditional ethno-religious connections to Irish-
catholicism and Rangers has traditional ethno-religious connections to Ulster-
protestantism. This often results in their supporters singing traditional songs that 
support either the Irish nationalist cause (Celtic) or the Ulster loyalist cause 
(Rangers). While there are necessary discussions to be had around this Bill more 
broadly, this chapter limits analysis to contextualizing the illustrative example of an 
act of Irish nationalist remembrance (in Scotland) to reveal the paradoxical nature of 
how remembrance is framed in Britain. Specifically, the discussion deals with 
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supporters of Celtic Football Club, many of whom are descendants of Irish 
immigrants. Sections of Celtic’s supporters sing the Irish song Roll of Honour at 
Celtic games. Roll of Honour remembers the ten Irish nationalist Hunger Strikers who 
died in 1981 during their protests against the British state’s treatment of Irish 
nationalist and British loyalist prisoners whilst incarcerated in British prisons for 
activities deemed by the British State as “terrorism”. 22 The crucial point for this 
chapter is the contrast between how two expressions of remembrance are treated by 
comparing how these Celtic supporters are treated differently from other citizens in 
Britain in relation to their respective remembrance. But more pointedly, it is the basis 
on which value judgments are made and how they are made by applying the criteria 
differently, depending on whether or not the remembrance is about those “serving” 
Britain and officially endorsed by powerful British opinion formers or those “serving” 
alternative and oppositional groups and not endorsed by powerful British opinion 
formers. Put simply, just as with some wider Muslim communities in the aftermath of 
“Islamic terror”, the relationship between ideological cause, actor, action and 
outcome of action are judged to be intimately connected when it applies to football 
supporters singing about their (Irish nationalist) remembrance in contrast to how these 
four elements are often judged to be unconnected when they apply to officially 
acceptable remembrance in Britain. This illustrative example is particularly revealing 
because it deals specifically with two examples that relate to respective Rolls of 
Honour.23  
 
A note of caution is necessary at this point. Comparing British remembrance and the 
Roll of Honour song remembrance is not comparing British military acts with Irish 
nationalist acts (irrespective of the fact that many more people have died as a result of 
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the former). It is comparing the relationship between an act of remembrance and its 
ideological cause, actors, acts, outcomes of these acts to show that one example 
(British Remembrance) is presented as relationship neutral in contrast to the Irish 
nationalist Roll of Honour remembrance which is presented as relationship active - 
supporting and endorsing the actors, actions and outcomes. Irrespective of who is 
doing the remembrance and what it claims to remember, it is inconsistent to claim that 
the relationship between the actors, actions and outcomes differs according to whose 
remembrance has the most supporters or whose is officially sanctioned by the state. In 
other words, given that discourses in Britain often stress British (military related) 
remembrance is not necessarily supporting the ideological cause, actors, acts or 
outcomes of such acts (illustrated by “support the troops not the war”), then the 
remembrance behaviors of others must also be considered potentially non-supportive 
of the ideological cause, actors, actions, and outcomes. Indeed, to claim otherwise is 
to confirm that one’s judgment is not based on logic but on (im)moral, political and 
subjective value judgments and is, therefore, open to legitimate debate and dissent.   
 
In both the enforcing and endorsing of this Bill, the authorities and wider opinion 
formers in Scotland have facilitated the policing of the Roll of Honour song as though 
it incites terrorist activities and/or supports terrorism. Moreover, much of the basis on 
which the legal system justifies its attempted prosecutions is predicated on connecting 
these variables proving that singing about remembrance is equivalent to supporting 
and endorsing the actors, acts and outcomes of such acts. Here, the inconsistent 
application of interpreting remembrance is visible. Celtic fans sing Roll of Honour 
and they are told they are supporting the IRA and the actions and outcomes of the 
IRA (despite no mention in the song of this group or any other paramilitary 
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organization and despite three of the individuals remembered in the song not being 
members of the IRA). It is also worth noting that two of the Hunger Strikers 
remembered in the song were democratically elected political representatives whilst 
prisoners of the British state. And for these football fans (and others potentially), they 
are being criminalized with the help of a paradoxical and inconsistent application of 
the meaning of remembrance that is politically motivated. This is not about dead 
children and innocent civilians per se. It is about making politically motivated 
judgments about what opinion formers in British society deem to be politically 
justified and politically unjustifiable. 
 
The situation is exacerbated when one considers that there already is a precedent in 
Britain for how to interpret remembrance and how these four elements (ideological 
cause; actor; action; outcome of action) relating to it should be interpreted and 
connected. Despite occurring with military uniforms, being performed in militaristic 
fashion and being wrapped in the paraphernalia of the armed forces, Remembrance 
Sunday in Britain is implicitly assumed by the government and the media not to be 
about justifying or supporting the ideology, actors, acts or outcomes of such acts. A 
major partner organization in British Remembrance, The Royal British Legion, 
explicitly connects Remembrance to peace and understanding, highlighting its 
organization as being “committed to helping young people understand the issues of 
Remembrance, conflict and the importance of peace.” 24 Yet despite this, and the 
ubiquity of phrases such as “support the troops not the war” being accepted as 
legitimate when applied to the British military, key opinion formers often attempt 
paradoxically to make these connections explicit for their political ends when 
incorporating citizens by proxy into appreciating and supporting the “outstanding 
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work bring done” as expressed by Lord Mawhinney and David Cameron. 
 
Conclusion 
British opinion formers articulate British Remembrance differently compared to other 
varieties of remembrance. On the one hand, British citizens are incorporated by proxy 
into supporting some or all of the four variables. Yet even when some British citizens 
show dissent about the war (ideological cause) and/or deaths and destruction 
(outcome), they are still encouraged and expected to “support the troops” in ways that 
are articulated as relationship neutral and ontologically detached. British 
remembrance can be articulated as both relationship neutral and relationship active to 
suit the specific agenda of those representing the remembrance and to fit the narrative 
of remembrance in particular contexts.  
 
Alternative expressions of remembrance such as “Islamist” and Irish nationalist 
remembrance are articulated as always being connected to the ideology, actions and 
outcomes. Indeed, a class-based activity I do with students illustrates this clearly. 
When discussing British militarism, sport and ideology, I begin the session with a role 
play scene that attempts to “make the foreign familiar,”25 in this case, by attempting 
to collect money from the students for a fictitious charity called Money for Martyrs. 
My charity bucket has clear Islamic insignia on it and I explain to the class that 
donated monies will go towards “supporting the children and dependents of those left 
behind by dead suicide bombers who have given their life for a cause they 
passionately believed in.” This scenario mirrors numerous real charitable scenes 
involving British military related organizations including Help for Heroes, Combat 
Stress, The British Forces Foundation and others.26 Once the students get over their 
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initial shock and realize this is role play, they universally and publicly proclaim, 
without exception, that they would not donate to this charity because it “would be 
supporting terrorists and terrorism.” Despite my best role play efforts to promote the 
view that their monetary gift would not represent support for terrorism or terrorist 
atrocities, this position is overwhelmingly rejected by the class. The unbreakable 
connection, therefore, between supporting terrorism (action), terrorists (actor) and 
deaths (outcome) are both unquestionable and irremovable to students in this 
example. These students quite clearly interpreted donating money to this charity as 
contributing much more than a monetary gift. It would represent support for and 
endorsement of terrorists, terrorist activities and the outcome of such terrorism. 
Indeed, students agreed it would also be reasonable to assume such donations would 
imply support or sympathy for Jihad (the ideological cause) too. In direct contrast, 
when considering British military charities, British citizens are often viewed as 
neutral and detached from the ideological cause, the actors, the actions and the 
outcomes (of action), yet actors carrying out alternative acts of violence (such as those 
labeled terrorists carrying out terrorism) or indeed, those who may engage in some 
form of remembrance of these actors, are always connected to some or all of the other 
three variables 27. It is this central paradox that exists every time a football supporter 
is arrested for singing Roll of Honour. Meanwhile, the British people, who have 
elected those who are responsible for the killings on its alleged behalf are excused 
from being held responsible for its killers and victims despite the fact that these killers 
are supposedly acting on the British people’s behalf and despite the overwhelming 
evidence revealing both ideological and material support for and endorsement of these 
actors and actions (and the outcomes resulting from them). When British citizens are 
connected to the killings and victims, it is often during official public pronouncements 
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by politicians and leaders using euphemistic vernacular to proclaim the support of the 
nation while framing this support for the killings and destruction as “appreciation and 
understanding of the outstanding work being done for our freedom.” And sport, as an 
undoubted sacred cultural practice, is one of the major sites in which this occurs. 
 
This analysis has implications for all groups who wish to remember or honor those 
whom they consider their war dead or martyrs. There are contradictions and 
paradoxes in how popular, moral and legal judgments are made regarding what is 
problematic and what is acceptable (if not desirable in fact) in relation to 
remembrance and its public expression in Britain. There either exists a relationship 
between the four variables or there does not. One cannot simply apply one set of 
relationship rules when one disagrees with a cause and apply another set of rules 
when one agrees with a cause. To do so, is to be illogical. Moreover, in doing so, 
Scotland is criminalizing and demonizing a generation of football supporters. In 
British society, the perceived relationship between these variables changes according 
to whether the cause and actor are deemed legitimate. Benedict Anderson’s oft-cited 
account of Imagined Communities highlights the ideological power of militaristic 
symbols such as the Cenotaph and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in London, 
explaining, “yet void as these tombs are of identifiable mortal remains or immortal 
souls, they are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings.”28 It is 
precisely because of this void of actual remains and any identifiable life history that 
such rich re-imagining and manipulation are able to give re-birth29 and fill an 
ideological vacuum with the idea of an “heroic and necessary sacrifice”. Current 
imaginings have extended this to ensure British (and Western) militarism is 
remembered in such a fashion which helps to reinforce an undeniable political, 
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ideological and ultimately subjective interpretation of military-civic relations that is 
exposed by the corporate culpability paradox.  
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